Privacy Policy

Master Text Reader

Effective date: 2026-11-19

This policy explains how this application handles information and how to contact us about privacy.

Information we process

Master Text Reader stores your exercise answers, selected passage language, answer dates, hint use, unfinished exercise and reading preferences locally on your iPhone. Accuracy, activity and reading streaks are calculated from that history. There are no user accounts. If you enable encrypted progress sync, the app generates a random installation secret stored in this iPhone’s Keychain and sends an encrypted copy of your answer history to our backend. The server stores only a SHA-256 hash of a derived installation authorization credential, an envelope version and encrypted content. That credential is derived on the device and sent over HTTPS for authorization, but is not stored in the database. The master secret and encryption key remain on the device; they are never sent to the server. Editorial exercise updates are public downloads. Requests to our API, home page or this policy necessarily expose network metadata, such as IP address, request path and connection timing, to Railway, our hosting provider. The backend temporarily uses connection addresses and hashed installation identifiers in memory to limit request rates. We do not ask for your name, email address or location.

How we use information

Local information provides offline reading exercises, explanations, adaptive recommendations, progress history and resume functionality. Optional encrypted sync keeps a server copy associated only with the installation secret; possession of that secret is required to retrieve or delete it. The app does not offer account-based transfer or promise recovery after loss of the secret. Public catalogue requests provide updated editorial passages. Notification preferences are used only to schedule the daily reminder locally. Operational processing and temporary rate limits maintain availability and help prevent abuse.

Service providers and sharing

Railway hosts this application’s HTTP service and persistent storage and processes requests and infrastructure metadata as part of providing that service. Network providers also carry HTTPS traffic. The app uses Apple’s iOS Keychain and local notification services on the device. We have not integrated advertising, analytics, social sign-in, email delivery or tracking SDKs and do not sell reading history. The backend does not log request bodies, authorization secrets, installation hashes or IP addresses; it emits basic startup and generic error messages. Railway may maintain its own infrastructure logs under its policies. If you choose to contact the public privacy address, your email provider and the recipient’s iCloud email service process that correspondence; the app itself does not send email.

Data retention

Local history and preferences remain until you remove them or remove the app, subject to iOS storage and backup behavior. Keychain storage may outlast removal of an app, so use the in-app deletion action before uninstalling when possible. An enabled sync replaces the previous logical server snapshot for that installation. The current snapshot remains until you request deletion; turning sync off does not delete an existing server copy. We do not configure a timed expiry. Rate-limit counters are process-local and use one-minute windows; inactive entries are removed when the bounded table needs space or the service restarts. We do not assert a retention period for Railway infrastructure logs, provider-managed copies or operating-system backups.

Deleting your information

Use Settings, Delete all reading data to delete your answer history, unfinished reading, server snapshot and installation secret and to cancel reminders. When a server copy may exist, the app requires successful HTTPS deletion before discarding its secret, so a failed request can be retried. If the deletion cannot finish, the app reports this and retains the secret and local state. Server deletion removes the logical SQLite record. Historical encrypted bytes may remain in SQLite journal or free pages and in provider-managed storage copies until those systems overwrite or expire them; immediate physical erasure of every backup is not promised. We do not provide a backup-restoration interface. Device or system backup copies follow Apple’s controls. Without the installation secret we cannot identify a particular encrypted snapshot or decrypt it. Public editorial content is not personal history and may remain cached locally.

Permissions and your choices

Notifications are optional and requested only when you enable the daily reminder. You can turn reminders off in the app to cancel pending reminders or withdraw notification permission in iPhone Settings. Reading, explanations and local progress work without that permission or an internet connection. Network access is used for optional sync, manual exercise updates and opening the public policy. No camera, microphone, photo library, contacts, geographic location or map permission is requested.

Your privacy rights

You can inspect your history and preferences in the app, disable sync, withdraw notification permission and request deletion through Settings. Depending on your location, you may have rights to access, correction, deletion, restriction, objection or a complaint to a relevant supervisory authority. For privacy questions or applicable rights requests, contact bastianludlow23@icloud.com. Do not email your installation secret. Because no account or contact identifier is linked to server snapshots, we may be unable to locate a snapshot without authorization through the installation itself. We can respond to general questions without that secret.

Security

The app generates a separate 32-byte cryptographically random secret for each installation and stores it using a device-only Keychain accessibility setting. Client-side AES-GCM encryption uses a key derived with HKDF-SHA256. A separate HKDF derivation produces the installation authorization credential, so the server cannot derive the encryption key from the credential it receives. The server authorizes snapshot operations using that credential and stores its hash rather than the credential. Public deployment uses HTTPS. Backend validation, bounded request sizes, rate limits and restricted database file permissions reduce exposure. Anyone who obtains the master secret can access and decrypt the associated snapshot; possession of only the authorization credential permits access to or deletion of the ciphertext, and loss of the secret prevents recovery. No system can guarantee absolute security.

Children’s privacy

Master Text Reader is intended for older school students, university students and adults developing analytical reading skills. It is not designed specifically for young children. The app does not ask users for an age, name or contact information and does not include advertising or social features. A parent or guardian with privacy concerns may contact bastianludlow23@icloud.com and can use the device’s in-app deletion controls.

Changes to this policy

We may update this policy when application behavior, hosting or data practices change. The effective date shown on this page identifies the current policy. Material changes will be reflected in the app or its public policy before or when the new processing begins. This page remains publicly available without login or cookies.